# Political Science 715: Core Seminar in Political Institutions

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Department of Political Science

Duke University

Class Room: LSRC D243

Class Time: W 10:15am-12:45pm

Office Hours: by appt.

**COURSE OVERVIEW**

This is the core graduate seminar for the Political Institutions field in Political Science. This field is concerned with the formal and informal rules, practices, and regularities that guide and constrain political choices and activities. It is concerned with the consequences of institutions, as well as with institutional emergence, stability, and change. The approach we will take is largely conceptual and theoretical. This will be especially true in the first half of the semester. In the second half, we will consider a number of specific institutional settings, including legislatures, courts, and the bureaucracy.

**REQUIRED READINGS**

The readings for this class consist largely of book chapters and papers. Except for a few, they are available electronically (including through the Sakai site for this course). Readings that are not available electronically are marked with **, and are available in Perkins Library. Please plan accordingly. For each week, the readings listed directly underneath the heading are required, and must be completed before class. Readings under the heading "Supplementary Readings" are not required. Note that the Supplementary Readings do not represent a comprehensive list on a topic; they are merely suggestions offered as a starting point if you want to get deeper into the literature in a particular area. If you plan to concentrate in institutions, you might consider buying the following books, of which we will read significant portions:

- John Aldrich. 1997. Why Parties? Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gary Cox. 1997. Making Votes Count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- John Huber and Charles Shipan. 2002. Deliberate Discretion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2011. Parliaments and Coalitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Elinor Ostrom. 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Milan Svolik. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Note that the reading load in this seminar is "lighter" than in many other graduate seminars, at least with respect to the number of articles/chapters/pages assigned each week. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THIS IS AN EASY OR LESS WORK-INTENSIVE COURSE. Rather, we expect you to read each assigned reading carefully, working through models and results as best you can, and that you will be prepared for a detailed discussion. We reserve the right to add or substitute readings depending on how our class discussions develop.

**GRADES AND EVALUATION**

This is a graduate seminar. This means that class will be conducted in a colloquium style. Because of this format, it is essential that every student has completed the assigned reading before class and is ready to participate in discussion. Your active and thoughtful participation is the key to making this seminar a success. Obviously, you should not miss class unless there are exceptional circumstances that keep you from being there.

Your grade will be based on the following:

- (20 percent): Class participation.
- (40 percent): Two reaction papers (3-4 pages) on the readings for a week. You can choose the particular weeks on which you would like to write. Your papers should provide a clear synopsis of the argument in each of the readings, compare and contrast the readings, and evaluate them critically (e.g., What are the problems/research questions addressed? How do the authors address this question? What are the main findings? How do the papers speak to one another? Which arguments do you find convincing? What are the weak parts of the arguments? What questions do the readings leave open?). Essays are due at the beginning of the following class (e.g., if you write on the readings for week 5, your essay is due at the beginning of class for week 6).
- (40 percent): Research paper (10 pages). Your assignment for this paper is (i) to identify the scholarly literature on a political institution of interest to you, (ii) within this literature, to locate a model, and (iii) to sketch an extension of this model that you believe to be substantively interesting and important. In order to do this, it is critical that you provide an overview of the relevant literature, and the place of the original model within it. You must then sketch your extension of the model, and explain why this extension is substantively important – that is, why it makes a worthwhile addition to our understanding of the institution being modeled. It is NOT necessary that you formalize your extension, and provide a fully-solved, analytical model. But your description should be rigorous and clear, and you should provide well-reasoned arguments for your extension, and for the impact you expect from it. You

must choose a topic by October 1, and submit a short abstract of the model and your proposed extension by October 15. The paper is due on the last day of class, November 26.

Course grades will be determined according to the following grading scale: A: 93-100 A-: 90-92

B+: 88-89 B: 83-87 B-: 80-82 C+: 78-79 C: 73-77 C-: 70-72 D+: 68-69 D: 63-67 D-: 60-62 F: 0-59

**ACADEMIC DISHONESTY**

Students and faculty at Duke are governed by the Duke Community Standard, and academic dishonesty will not be tolerated. If I suspect that a student has attempted to represent someone else's work as their own, or to cheat in any other manner on an exam or a written assignment, I will refer the case to the Office of Student Conduct in accordance with university policy. If a violation of the academic integrity policy is found to have occurred, the minimum penalty will be a zero (0) on the assignment/exam in question. If you have any questions about plagiarism and proper citation methods, please consult the Duke Tutorial on Plagiarism.

**STUDENTS WITH CHALLENGES**

Students with challenges who require individualized testing or other accommodations should identify themselves and express their needs during the first week of the semester. Where the challenge is not immediately apparent, verification will be required.

**APPROXIMATE SEMESTER SCHEDULE**

**Week 1** (8/25): Introduction – formal and informal institutions

**Week 2** (9/1): Approaches to the study of institutions

**Reading:**

- Margaret Levi and Victor Menaldo. 2015. "The New Economic Institutionalism in Historical Perspective." In J. Ghandi and R. Ruiz-Rufino. Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions. London: Routledge.
- Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology." Journal of Theoretical Politics 15: 123-144.
- Arthur Denzau and Douglass C. North. 1994. "Shared mental models: ideologies and institutions." Kyklos 47: 3-31.
- Adam Przeworski. 2004. "Institutions Matter?" Government and Opposition. 39: 527-540.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- Granovetter, Mark S. 2005. "The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes." Journal of Economic Perspectives. 19: 33-50.

- Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 1998. “The Approach of Institutional Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature. 36: 166-92.
- March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life.” American Political Science Review. 78: 734-749.
- Przeworski, Adam. 2004. “Institutions Matter?” Government and Opposition. 39: 527-540.
- Peter Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. ”Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.” Political Studies 44 (4): 936-57.
- Rothstein, Bo. 1996. “Political Institutions: An Overview.” In Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ken Shepsle. 2006. “Rational Choice Institutionalism.” In S. Binder, R. Rhodes, B. Rockman. Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science. 2: 369-404.
- Weingast, Barry R. 1996. “Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives.” In Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science. New York: Oxford University Press.

**Week 3** (9/8): Transaction Costs and the Principal-Agent Problem

**Reading:**

- Douglass North. 1991. “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 97-112.
- John Huber and Charles Shipan. 2002. Deliberate Discretion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2 and 4.
- Mat McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science 28: 165-179.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- Bendor, Jonathan, Amihai Glazer, and Thomas Hammond. 2001. “Theories of Delegation.” Annual Review of Political Science 4: 234-269.
- McNollgast. 1987. “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 3: 243-277.
- Gary Miller. 2005. “The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models.” Annual Review of Political Science 8: 203-225.
- Milgrom, Paul, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast. 1990. “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.” Economics and Politics 2: 1-22.
- North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williamson, Oliver E. 2000. “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.” Journal of Economic Literature. 38: 595-613.
- Bendor, Jonathan, Amihai Glazer, and Thomas Hammond. 2001. “Theories of Delegation.” Annual Review of Political Science 4: 234-269.

- Bendor, Jonathan and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. “Spatial Models of Delegation.” American Political Science Review. 98: 293-310.
- Epstein, David and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Volden, Craig. 2002. “A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System.” American Journal of Political Science 46: 111-133.

**Week 4** (9/15): Preference Aggregation

**Reading:**

- Krehbiel, Keith. 1988. “Spatial Models of Legislative Choice.” Legislative Studies Quarterly. 13: 259-319.
- Ken Shepsle and Barry Weingast. 1981. “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice.” Public Choice. 37: 503-519.
- Gary Cox and Ken Shepsle. 2007. “Majority cycling and agenda manipulation: Richard McKelvey’s contributions and legacy.” Positive changes in political science: The legacy of Richard D. McKelvey’s most influential writings. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- Arrow, Kenneth. 1983. “Values and Collective Decision-Making.” In Ken Arrow. Social Choice and Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Buchanan, James M. 1954. “Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets.” The Journal of Political Economy 62: 114-23.
- Ferejohn, John and Charles Shipan. 1990. “Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 1-20.
- McKelvey, Richard D. 1976. “Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control.” Journal of Economic Theory 12: 472-
- 482.
- Miller, David. 1992. “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice.” Political Studies 40: 54-67.
- Patty, John and Maggie Elizabeth Penn. 2014. Social Choice and Legitimacy: The Possibilities of Impossibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Plott, Charles. 1967. “A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule.” American Economic Review 57: 787-806.
- Riker, William. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press.
- Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo.” Public Choice 4: 27-43.
- Sen, Amartya. 1995. “Rationality and Social Choice.” American Economic Review 85: 1-24.
- Shepsle, Ken. 1979. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models.” American Journal of Political Science 23: 27-59.
- Shepsle, Ken and Barry Weingast. 1984. “Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions.” American Journal of Political Science 28: 49-74.

**Week 5** (9/22): Collective Action and institutions as equilibria

**Reading:**

- Elinor Ostrom. 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3.
- Randall Calvert. 1995. "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions." In Jeff Banks and Eric Hanushek (eds.). Modern Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- John Carey. 2000. "Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions." Comparative Political Studies 33: 735-761.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- Bendor, Jonathan and Dilip Mookherjee. 1987. "Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action." American Political Science Review. 81: 129154.
- Calvert, Randall. 1992. "Leadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination." International Political Science Review. 13: 7-24.
- Calvert, Randall. 1995. "Rational Actors, Equilibrium and Social Institutions." In Jack Knight and Itai Sened (eds.) Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. 2001. Rational Ritual. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Greif, Avner. 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies." The Journal of Political Economy. 102: 912-50.
- Greif, Avner. 1998. "Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis." American Economic Review 88: 80-94.
- Karklins, Rasma and Roger Petersen. 1993. "Decision Calculus of Protestors and Regimes." Journal of Politics. 55:588-615.
- Laitin, David. 1994. "The Tower of Babel as a Coordination Game." American Political Science Review. 88:622-34.
- Lohmann, Suzanne. 1994. "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91." World Politics. 47:42-101.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker, and Roy Gardner. 1992. "Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible." American Political Science Review. 86: 404-417.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action." American Political Science Review. 92: 1-22.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. "Coping with Tragedies of the Commons." Annual Review of Political Science. 2: 493-535.
- Shepsle, Kenneth. 2007. "Old Questions and New Answers about Institutions: The Riker Objection Revisited." In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- William Riker. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." American Political Science Review 74: 432-446.

**Week 6** (9/29): no class

**Week 7** (10/6): Institutional Emergence and Change

**Reading:**

- Avner Greif and David Laitin. 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change." American Political Science Review 98: 633-652.
- Ken Kollman, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page. 1997. "Political institutions and sorting in a Tiebout model." The American Economic Review 87: 977-992.
- Jack Knight. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- David, Paul A. 1994. "Why Are Institutions the 'Carriers of History'? Path-Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions." Structural Change and Economic Dynamics. 5: 205-20.
- Ensminger, Jean and Jack Knight. 1997. "Changing Social Norms: Common Property, Bridewealth, and Clan Exogamy." Current Anthropology. 38: 1-24.
- Gamm, Gerald and Ken Shepsle. 1989. "Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825." Legislative Studies Quarterly 14:39-66.
- Knight, Jack. 1995. "Models, Interpretations and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change." in Jack Knight and Itai Sened (eds.). Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Pierson, Paul. 2000. "The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change." Governance. 13: 475-499.
- Pierson, Paul. 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." American Political Science Review 94: 251-67.
- Robert Sugden. 1989. "Spontaneous Order." Journal of Economic Perspectives 3:85-97.
- Ullmann-Margalist, Edna. 1978. "Invisible-Hand Explanations." Synthese 39: 263-291.
- Ullmann-Margalist, Edna. 1990. "Revision of Norms." Ethics 100: 756-767.

**Week 8** (10/13): Parties and Electoral Systems

**Reading:**

- John Aldrich. 2011. Why Parties? A Second Look. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1 and 2 (through page 43).
- Gary Cox. 1997. Making Votes Count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
- Ronald Rogowski and Mark Kayser. 2002. "Majoritarian electoral systems and consumer power: price-level evidence from the OECD countries." American Journal of Political Science : 526-539.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- Bawn, Kathleen and Michael Thies. 2003. "A Comparative Theory of Electoral Incentives." Journal of Theoretial Politics 15: 5-32.

- Bawn, Kathleen.1993. “The logic of institutional preferences: German electoral law as a social choice outcome.” American Journal of Political Science : 965-989.
- Chang, Eric and Miriam A. Golden. 2007. “Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption.” British Journal of Political Science 37: 115-137.
- Gary Cox. 1990. “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 34: 903-935.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
- Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. Methuen.
- Ferree, Karen, G. Bingham Powell, and Ethan Scheiner. 2014. “Context, Electoral Rules, and Party Systems.” Annual Review of Political Science 17: 421-39.
- Hotelling, Harold. 1929. “Stability in Competition.” Economic Journal 39: 41-57.
- Jones, Mark, Sebastian Saiegh, Pablo Spiller and Mariano Tommasi. 2002. “Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System.” American Journal of Political Science 46: 656-669.
- Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico. 2001. “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives.” American Economic Review 91: 225-239.
- Remington, Thomas and Steven Smith. 1996. “Political Goals, Institutional Context, and the Choice of an Electoral System: The Russian Parliamentary Election Law.” American Journal of Political Science 40: 1253-1279.

**Week 9** (10/20): Legislative Institutions

**Reading:**

- John Huber. 1996. “The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Political Science Review 90: 269-82.
- Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2011. Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 2, 3, and 5.
- Roberts, Jason and Steven Smith. 2007. “The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Institutions in Congress: Path Dependency in House and Senate Institutional Development.” In David Brady and Mathew McCubbins (eds.). Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress. Vol. 2.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- Aldrich, John and David Rohde. 2000. “The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government.” In Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher (eds.). Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Baldez, Lisa and John Carey. 1999. “Presidential Agenda Control and Spending Policy: Lessons from General Pinochet?s Constitutions.” American Journal of Political Science 43: 29-55.
- Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83 (4): 1181-1206.
- Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Heller, William. 2001. “Making policy stick: why the government gets what it wants in multiparty parliaments.” American Journal of Political Science. 45: 780798.
- Huber, John D, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. “Cabinet Decision Rules and Political Uncertainty in Parliamentary Bargaining.” American Political Science Review 95 (2): 345-360.
- Huber, John D. 1992. “Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States.” American Political Science Review 86(3): 675-687.
- Keith Krehbiel. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Linz, Juan. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1: 51-69.
- Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart. 1997. “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal.” Comparative Politics 29: 449-471.
- Martin, Lanny and Georg Vanberg. 2014. “Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median, Ministerial Autonomy, and the Coalition Compromise.” American Journal of Political Science. 58: 979-996.
- Rohde, David. 1994. “Parties and Committees in the House: Member Motivations, Issues, and Institutional Arrangements.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 341-359.
- Samuels, David and Matthew Shugart. 2003. “Presidentialism, Elections, and Representation.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 15: 33-60.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. “Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions.” Legislative Studies Quarterly. 19: 149-179.
- Strom, Kaare, Wolfgang Mueller and Torbjorn Bergman. 2008. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford University Press.
- Shugart, Matthew and John Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thies, Michael F. 2001. “Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments.” American Journal of Political Science 45(3): 580-98.

**Week 10** (10/27): Coalition Bargaining

**Reading:**

- David Baron and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. “Bargaining in legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83: 1181-1206.
- Scott de Marchi and Michael Laver. 2020. “Government formation as logrolling in high-dimensional spaces.” Journal of Politics.
- Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2021. “Coalition bargaining before an audience.” American Political Science Review.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- Back, Hanna, Marc Debus and Patrick Dumont. 2011. “Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 50(4):441-78.
- Bassi, Anna. 2013. “A Model of Endogenous Government Formation.” American Journal of Political Science 57(4):777-93.

- Cutler, Josh, Scott de Marchi, Max Gallop, Florian Hollenbach, Michael Laver and Matthias Orlovski. 2016. "Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems." British Journal of Political Science 46(1):31-43.
- Falco-Gimeno, Albert and Indridi H. Indridason. 2013. "Uncertainty, Complexity, and Gamson's Law: Comparing Coalition Formation in Western Europe." West European Politics 36(1):221-47.
- Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1996. Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield. 1990. Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Laver, Michael, Scott de Marchi and Hande Mutlu. 2011. "Negotiation in Legislatures over Government Formation." Public Choice 147(3-4):285-304.
- Martin, Lanny W. and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2010. "The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation." American Political Science Review 104(3):503-18.
- Morelli, Massimo. 1999. "Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining." American Political Science Review 93(4):809-20.

**Week 11** (11/3): The Judiciary

**Reading:**

- Clark, Tom. 2009. "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy." American Journal of Political Science 53: 971-989.
- Chuck Cameron and Jonathan Kastellec. 2016. "Are Supreme Court Nominations a Move-the-Median Game?" American Political Science Review 110: 778-797.
- Georg Vanberg. 2015. "Constitutional Courts in Comparative Perspective." Annual Review of Political Science. 18: 167-185.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- Bonneau, Chris W., Thomas H. Hammond, Forrest Maltzman, and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 2007. "Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court," American Journal of Political Science. 51: 890-905.
- Cameron, Charles, Jeffrey Segal, and Donald Songer. 2000. "Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions." American Political Science Review 94: 101-116.
- Clark, Tom and Benjamin Lauderdale. 2010. "Locating Supreme Court Opinions in Doctrine Space." American Journal of Political Science 54: 871-90.
- Carruba, Cliff and Matthew Gabel. 2014. International Courts & the Performance of International Agreements: A general theory with evidence from the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carrubba, Cliff, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin, and Georg Vanberg. 2012. "Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?" American Journal of Political Science 56: 400-412.
- Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. 1998. The Choices Justices Make. Washington DC: CQ Press.
- Helmke, Gretchen. 2005. Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Benjamin E. Lauderdale and Tom S. Clark. 2012. "The Supreme Court's Many Median Justices." American Political Science Review 106: 847-866.
- Lax, Jeffrey. 2007. "Constructing Legal Rules on Appellate Courts." American Political Science Review 101: 591-604.
- Lax, Jeffrey. 2011. "The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine." Annual Review of Political Science 14: 131-157.
- Lax, Jeffrey R. 2012. "Political constraints on legal doctrine: how hierarchy shapes the law." The Journal of Politics 74: 765-781.
- Moraski, Brian J. and Charles R. Shipan. 1999. "The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Choice and Constraints." American Journal of Political Science. 43: 1069.
- Segal, Jeffrey. 1997. "Separation of Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and the Courts." American Political Science Review 91: 28-44.
- Staton, Jeffrey. 2006. "Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Results." American Journal of Political Science 50: 98-112.
- Staton, Jeffrey and Georg Vanberg. 2008. "Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions." American Journal of Political Science. 52: 504-519.
- Stephenson, Matthew. 2003. "When the Devil Turns...: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review." Journal of Legal Studies 32: 59-90.
- Vanberg, Georg. 2005. The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

**Week 12** (11/10): Institutions and Development

**Reading:**

- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth." In Aghion, Phillipe and Steven Durlauf (eds.). Handbook of Economic Growth. Elsevier.
- Timur Kuran and Jared Rubin. 2018. "The Financial Power of the Powerless: Socio-economic Status and Interest Rates under Partial Rule of Law." The Economic Journal 128: 758-796.
- Mancur Olson. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." American Political Science Review. 87: 567-576.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2005. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buchanan, James and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Chapters 6, 7, 17.
- Engerman, Stanley and Kenneth Sokoloff. 2008. "Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and Economic Development: Theory, History, and Findings." Annual Review of Political Science. 11: 119-35.
- Haggard, Stephen, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede. 2008. "The Rule of Law and Economic Development." Annual Review of Political Science. 11: 2005-34.
- Timur Kuran. 2004. "Why the Middle East is economically underdeveloped: historical mechanisms of institutional stagnation." Journal of Economic Perspectives 18: 71-90.

- McGuire, Martin C. and Mancur Olson, Jr.. 1996. “The economics of autocracy and majority rule: The invisible hand and the use of force.” Journal of Economic Literature. 34: 72?96.
- North, Douglass, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast. 2006. “A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History.” NBER Working Paper 12795. (http://www.nber.org/papers/w12795).
- North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in SeventeenthCentury England.” Journal of Economic History. 49: 803-32.
- Weingast, Barry R. 1993. “Constitutions and Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 149: 286- 311.

**Week 13** (11/17): Authoritarian Institutions

**Reading:**

- Edmund Malesky, Paul Schuler, and Anh Tran. 2012. “The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly.” American Political Science Review. 106: 762-786.
- Melanie Manion. 2014. “‘Good Types’ in Authoritarian Elections: The Selectoral Connection in Chinese Local Congresses.” Comparative Political Studies 1-33.
- Milan Svolik. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2 and 6.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo. 2014. “Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution.” British Journal of Political Science. 44: 575-603.
- Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2006. “Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships.” Economics and Politics. 18:1-26.
- Wintrobe, Ronald. 1990. “The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship.” American Political Science Review 84: 849-872.